Product Description

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #671082 in Books
• Published on: 1995-02-01
• Original language: English
• Dimensions: 1.29 pounds
• Binding: Paperback
• 412 pages

From Publishers Weekly
This major scholarly study sheds important new light on the origins of the 1950-1953 Korean conflict and the Cold War in Asia. Featuring primary source material that includes cable communications between Josef Stalin and Mao Zedong and texts of secret agreements between their governments, the book reveals that in late 1949 Moscow and Beijing were confronted with North Korean leader Kim Il-sung's determination to attack the South; that the June 1950 invasion was directly assisted by Stalin and reluctantly backed by Mao at the Soviet dictator's insistence; that Mao had his own forces deployed to intervene on behalf of the North Koreans weeks before the September 1950 Inchon landing. The authors conclude that the decision to declare war against South Korea and later against the U.S. cannot be ascribed soley to Kim's adventurism, pressure from Stalin, or a conspiratorial agreement among the three communist leaders. The armed conflict came about "in bits and pieces," they argue. "It was reckless warmaking of the worst kind," and much of the documentation is published here for the first time. Goncharov is a member of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs; Lewis is a professor of Chinese politics at Stanford; Xue Litai is a research associate at Stanford. Photos.
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal
This title, the first using newly available resources from China and Russia, represents the opening of a new era in the study of Sino-Soviet relations and their effect on international politics. The credentials of the authors are of the highest: Goncharov is a member of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while John Lewis and Xue Litai (co-authors of China Builds the Bomb , Stanford Univ. Pr., 1988) are at Stanford University. Together they examine the delicate relations among Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao and their approval of Kim Il Sung's invasion of South Korea in 1950. The use of three different ways to transliterate the Chinese resources presents a problem, as does the mixture of footnotes and endnotes. These drawbacks are offset by several strong points, including the extensive references and the translations of primary documents, which appear in the appendix. Strongly recommended for any library supporting graduate programs in Sino-Soviet relations.
- John Sandstrom, Houston P.L.
Copyright 1994 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Booklist
The Great Teacher (Stalin) and the Great Helmsman (Mao) did not get along well, and scholars have long speculated on their excruciating negotiations, which were, in turn, the subject of vitriolic recriminations after the Sino-Soviet alliance fell apart. With access to Stalin and Mao's correspondence, much of it reprinted in the appendix, Goncharov and two other writers--an American, John W. Lewis, and a Chinese, Xue Litai--sort through the details. When the two bosses met in December 1949, they presented a united and intimidating Communist front. Behind the facade, however, Stalin haggled over Soviet rights in Manchuria, and Mao complained about Soviet meddling in his party. The two were not even in accord over the war that Kim Il Sung wanted in his Korea. Mao preferred to attack Taiwan instead. The war their ruthless decision making ignited did, however, produce a more equal relationship between them--a process that takes on an exceptionally cold-blooded cast considering the human cost. Hefty, serious documentation on a hitherto Byzantine case of Cold War politics. Gilbert Taylor