Product Description

The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds. Professor Shoemaker opposes the "inner sense" conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have nonrepresentational features--"qualia"--that determine what it is like to have them. Among the other topics covered are the unity of consciousness, and the idea that the "first-person perspective" gives a privileged route to philosophical understanding of the nature of mind.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #1722205 in Books
• Published on: 1996-09-13
• Original language: English
• Dimensions: .78 pounds
• Binding: Paperback
• 300 pages

Review
"I believe that Shomemaker's papers on self-knowledge and the nature of phenomenal consciousness . . . constitute a deeply original and systematic body of work on these most difficult and perplexing philosophical issues." --Jaegwon Kim, Brown University

"The book will, I am sure, be regarded as must-reading by philosophers of mind; the papers are at the cutting edge of discussion of knowledge of our own mental states." --Brian McLaughlin, Rutgers University

"This collection seems to me the plum among the many impressive recent philosophical treatments of consciousness and self-knowledge, and the most useful as a starting point for further work. Every turn is made brilliantly and plainly, with lucid, compelling argumentation...." Mark Crimmins, Dialogue