Product Description

With Ronald Reagan's support, the United States attempted to trade arms for hostages held by Iranian terrorists; some of the money then funded the guerilla activities of the Nicaraguan Contras, a group that Congress had forbidden the administration to support. In this first person "cautionary tale of power", the duplicity of the Reagan administration and the paralyzing effects of the cover-up are exposed.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #1617811 in Books
• Published on: 1998-10-26
• Released on: 1998-10-26
• Original language: English
• Dimensions: 1.83 pounds
• Binding: Paperback
• 592 pages

From Library Journal
Walsh was the independent counsel for the Iran-Contra investigation from 1986 to 1993. Though he writes earnestly and with the highest integrity, his recounting of the events surrounding Iran-Contra is as confusing as the hearings themselves and is overburdened by excessive detail. Walsh alleges that Presidents Reagan and Bush could have been indicted for obstruction of justice and misuse of the presidential pardon, respectively. However, Reagan is not Nixon, and Iran-Contra never fascinated and repelled the public like Watergate. The long ordeal ended with few perpetrators being convicted, while members of Reagan's cabinet built an impenetrable firewall around the president. Recommended cautiously for large collections; buy as demand warrants.
-?Karl Helicher, Upper Merion Twp. Lib., King of Prussia, Pa.
Copyright 1997 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Booklist
An obsessed Captain Ahab or a gallant St. George? Walsh provoked strong emotions and editorials throughout his seven-year-long multimillion-dollar attempt to nail Reaganauts in the Iran-Contra fandango. Attempt is the operative word, for he obtained few convictions and had many of those overturned on appeal. In explaining such a scorecard, Walsh strenuously argues that he and staff were stymied by lies and cover-ups, capped by Bush's pardons; he also engages in serious score-settling with the likes of Caspar Weinberger, George Bush, and Bob Dole. Interestingly, in his first sentence, Walsh says he shares with "many who will read this book" (most likely participants in and dedicated students of the scandal) the trait of "willfulness." To Walsh, that trait perhaps means meticulously reviewing his justifications for his prosecutorial decisions; to Walsh's targets, that trait meant coercing testimony by forcing huge legal bills on them or influencing the 1992 election by his "October surprise" indictment of Weinberger ("sheer inadvertence" is Walsh's explanation). Though sternly accusative, Walsh also waxes defensive about his conduct of his office, and those debating the merits of special prosecutors--a divisive contemporary political issue--have much to masticate in his memoir. Gilbert Taylor

From Kirkus Reviews
Walsh, the former independent counsel for Iran/Contra matters, submits an injudicious, self-serving brief in aid of reversing the probable verdict of history that his extended and contentious investigation of malfeasance at the highest levels of US government produced appreciably more heat than light. Drawing on the record he compiled in the course of a six-year investigation, the author delivers a largely chronological narrative built around a rehash of serious charges that were never proved in court. At issue was the question of whether Ronald Reagan exceeded his presidential authority in sanctioning a hushed-up arms-for-hostages deal with Iran, which also yielded cash used to equip the Contra forces in Nicaragua. These clandestine operations came to light in the mid-1980s, and Walsh was called in to unravel the tangled web at the start of 1987. By the author's account, he had no axes to grind at the outset of his inquiry. Perhaps not, but his office became vaultingly ambitious in its selection of targets after failing to put the usual CIA, National Security Council, or White House suspects, let alone Oliver North and John Poindexter, behind bars. At various times, Walsh recounts, he and his aides went after George Bush, Edwin Meese, Donald Regan, George Shultz, and Caspar Weinberger. The fact that he got nary a one of these men in the dock does not stop the author from repeating in detail allegations of supposed misdeeds that resulted in but a single indictment. Attentive readers will learn that feckless subordinates, ill-informed judges, and national-security hurdles, not Walsh, are to blame for the paucity of scalps. A spirited if one-sided effort by Walsh to have the last word on the Iran/Contra affair and to justify his largely unavailing stewardship of the independent counsel's office. (photos, not seen) (Author tour) -- Copyright ©1997, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.